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Abstract
The corporate finance literature documents that managers tend to overinvest into
physical assets. A number of theoretical contributions have aimed to explain this stylized
fact, most of them focussing on a fundamental agency problem between shareholders
and managers. The present paper shows that overinvestments are not necessarily the
(negative) consequence of agency problems between shareholders and managers, but in-
stead might be a second-best optimal response if the scope of court-enforceable contracts
is limited. In such an environment a firm has to rely on relational contracts in order to
manage the agency relationship with its workforce. The paper shows that investments
into physical productive assets enhance the enforceability of relational contracts and
hence investments optimally are “too high”.
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1 Introduction
A prominent and well established stylized fact in corporate finance is that managers tend to
overinvest, or, as Stein (2003) puts it, that they “...have an excessive taste for running large
firms, as opposed to simply profitable ones” (p. 119). Numerous theories have been developed
to explain this pattern: managers’ taste for empire building; see Williamson (1964), Jensen
(1986), Jensen (1993); short-termism of managers who focus on activities the market can
easily observe; see Stein (1989), Bebchuk and Stole (1993); managerial overconfidence into
their own abilities; see Roll (1986), Heaton (2002); or asymmetric information with respect
to new investment opportunities; see Inderst and Klein (2007). All these theories share the
perception that overinvestments are caused by agency problems between a firm and its man-
agement. Hence, mechanisms to reduce free cash-flow – and consequently the management’s
ability to start projects with a negative net-present-value – have been suggested as optimal
responses to this perceived fundamental agency problem. However, there is no clear evidence
that reducing a firm’s free cash-flow and restricting a manager’s investment opportunities
increases firm value - on the contrary, investors often assess capital investments positively;
see McConnell and Muscarella (1985), Myers (2003).
This paper shows that overinvestments – investments where marginal costs exceed (direct)
marginal benefits – can have a positive impact on firm value, namely by making it easier to
motivate a firm’s workforce: If formal, court-enforceable incentive contracts are limited in
their scope – e.g., because of a lack of good verifiable performance measures – managing a
firm’s employer-worker relationships in a volatile environment becomes difficult. In this case,
implicit agreements (so-called relational contracts) are needed to motivate a firm’s workforce.
If the firm’s commitment in these relational contracts is limited, though, a firm’s employment
might be restricted to a level that is inefficiently low because the firm cannot make credible
promises to all agents it would like to motivate. Moreover, if it is unable to motivate the
employee, it is not optimal to employ him in the first place. Similar problems can arise if
firms are liquidity constrained in some states of the world which means that they have to
defer payments into the future, exacerbating commitment problems.
Then, managers optimally overinvest in order to improve the enforceability of relational
contracts with their employees as capital investments ceteris paribus increase future revenues,
whereas the associated investment costs are sunk. Thereby, larger investments A) strengthen
the firm’s commitment by raising future profits, and B) increase its financial flexibility by gen-
erating additional cash flow. Hence, overinvestments partially mitigate contracting frictions,
and are not necessarily an inefficient manifestation of intra-firm agency problems.
The starting point of this paper is the moral hazard principal agent literature, which
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focuses on unobservable effort choice as a determinant of firm profitability (or productivity).
An improved solution to the moral hazard problem will, ceteris paribus, increase productivity.
While there exists a large literature, building on Holmstrom (1979) and Grossman and Hart
(1983), focusing on explicit contracts that reward the agent based on verifiable performance
measures, there has been an increased interest in implicit contracts as a way to mitigate the
moral hazard problem; see, e.g. Bull (1987), MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), Levin (2003).
In a more recent contribution, Gibbons and Henderson (2013) argue that different aspects
of relational contracts are responsible for observed persistent performance differences among
seemingly similar enterprises that also exist within industrialized countries.
Relational (or implicit) contracts employ repeated game logic to use observable but un-
verifiable information and do not rely on explicit, court enforceable, performance measures
to motivate workers. In the recent past there have been a number of papers investigating
richer dynamics and the effect of stochastic shocks on the efficiency and stability of implicit
contracts – see, e.g., Li and Matouschek (2013), Englmaier and Segal (2011) – to which the
present paper relates. Finally, we relate to some recent papers linking a firm’s financing con-
ditions and decisions to the enforceability of relational contracts. Contreras (2013) analyzes
how relational contracts formed between a firm and its supplier interact with the quality
of financial markets. Fahn, Merlo, and Wamser (2014) show how equity financing helps to
enforce relational contracts. If debt is too high, a firm is able to share some of the costs of
reneging on relational contracts with its creditors.
We develop a model where a firm’s inputs are physical capital and labor, and the time
horizon is infinite. The firm can employ an arbitrary number of agents and output in every
period is increasing in the firm’s workforce, as long as the employed agents choose high effort.
Moreover, capital investments are made at the beginning of the game and increase output as
well.
Different from the corporate finance literature – where overinvestments generally are the
consequence of agency problems between shareholders (who might have financed the initial
investment into capital) and a firm’s management – we assume that both parties’ preferences
are perfectly aligned. However, there are two features of the environment that can restrict
the firm’s behavior and consequently reduce efficiency and profits:
First, neither an employees’s effort nor the resulting output are verifiable.1 As the firm and
its management want to induce agents to exert high effort and agents have to be sufficiently
incentivized, relational contracts where the firm implicitly promises to reward performance
have to be employed. In case the firm does not honour its promise of rewarding performance,
1To motivate this assumption, assume that there are components of an employee’s effort where verification
is too difficult or too costly.
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this will induce a loss of trust of the firm’s workforce, which will subsequently refrain from
exerting high effort. Furthermore, if the firm reneges on one of its promises, it is optimal
to renege on all of its promises, and hiring additional workers not only increases equilibrium
profits but also the temptation to deviate. All this implies that the firm only has an incentive
to honor its promises if the future value of the firm – determined by the net present value
of its future profits – is sufficiently large. This constraint on credible promises concerning
future rewards for high effort will limit the number of agents the firm can motivate (and hence
profitably employ) through such promises. The firm may be restricted to an employment level
that is below the (unconstrained) profit-maximizing value. Hence, frictions in the enforcement
of formal contracts can restrict firm size, a result also derived by Powell (2013).
Second, we explicitly model the consequences of a volatile environment. In particular, we
assume that the firm may face varying market conditions: demand may be either high or low.
We assume that the firm faces a liquidity constraint and can only use generated cash-flow –
funds that have been earned by selling its output – to compensate employees.2 Under this
assumption an employee’s compensation will have to vary with the company’s earnings. Then,
a major part of total payments is paid out to agents whenever demand is high. However,
the maximum amount the firm is willing to pay out instead of reneging and shutting down
is determined by its expected future profits, independent of the difference between available
liquidity across states of the world. A larger difference between the situation in good and bad
states and hence higher payment obligations in the good state increases the firm’s reneging
temptation – and will limit the firm’s employment to an inefficiently low level even if its
discount factor is arbitrarily close to (but still bounded away from) 1.
The firm can mitigate its problems with motivating and managing its workforce by (seem-
ingly excessive) investments into physical capital. Since investment costs are sunk, they are
not considered by the firm whenever it faces the decision whether to keep its promises in
the relational contract or not. Due to sunk investment costs and as an increased capital
base positively affects future profits, investments into capital improve the enforceability of
relational contracts. In this context, overinvestments – i.e., capital levels where the marginal
investment costs exceed the direct marginal benefits – are possible. Overinvestments also
relax employment restrictions induced by low liquidity: additional investments raise the out-
put in all states and hence increase the available cash-flow also in bad states of the world,
i.e., when demand is low.
2In a robustness exercise we show that the ability to accumulate and hold cash reserves does not solve
this problem: Holding cash reserves is associated with present costs - these funds cannot be consumed today
- in exchange for future profits, since higher employment can only be enforced in later periods. Hence, it will
not be optimal to accumulate cash reserves that are sufficient to enforce efficient employment.
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This result is interesting in comparison to the classic literature where overinvestments
are interpreted as a consequence of agency problems between shareholders and management:
Means to reduce free cash-flow – like issuing debt – are proposed as (second-best) solutions to
the problem of overinvestments; see, e.g., Hart and Moore (1995), Zwiebel (1996). We show
that the additional cash-flow generated by overinvestments can be used to increase the firm’s
financial flexibility and mitigate the agency problem between the firm and its workforce.
Moreover, our results are in line with several empirical studies comparing the behav-
ior of private and publicly listed firms. The former are generally regarded to attach more
importance to long-term relationships, which in our model translates into having a larger
discount factor. We predict that the use of overinvestments generally is more pronounced
if the firm’s discount factor is small. This relates to Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and
Zutter (2008), who show that publicly listed US firms pay substantially more for acquisi-
tions than privately held firms. According to our model, such investments are more valu-
able for publicly listed than for privately-held firms – since the former also use them to
increase commitment in relational contracts with their employees. Hence, the willingness
to pay for acquisitions of publicly listed firms should ceteris paribus be higher. In addi-
tion, the “constrained-liquidity+limited-commitment” mechanism is most likely to restrict
employment for intermediate discount factors. This also implies that residual profits (more
precisely, freely available cash flows) vary more at firms with a higher discount factor, be-
cause constrained liquidity forces many of them to pass all their revenues on to employees if
demand is low. Firms with a low discount factor, on the other hand, can also keep some cash
in low-demand states. Given we expect firms to pay higher dividends to their shareholders
in states where they have more free cash flow, we predict dividend payments of firms with
a higher discount factor to vary more than of firms with a lower discount factor. This pre-
diction is consistent with data documented by Michaely and Roberts (2012): privately held
firms (having higher discount factors) smooth dividends significantly less than firms whose
shares are publicly traded.
The paper proceeds as follows. After introducing the basic model setup we show how
the firm’s liquidity constraint can restrict firm size. If the volatility in the market, i.e.,
the difference between the firm’s earning in the good and bad state, is sufficiently large,
employment always is inefficiently low, irrespective of the total expected surplus that can be
generated. In the next part, we show that investments into physical assets relax the firm’s
constraints, inducing overinvestments whenever employment is restricted. Finally, we show
that our results still hold when the firm is able to accumulate and hold cash reserves. The
Appendix collects proofs and details of the derivations.
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2 Model Setup
We first describe the basic model. In the next subsection we will describe the informational
structure of the game. There is one firm (“principal”), inputs for production are capital and
labor. Time is discrete, the time horizon infinite, and all players are risk-neutral and share
a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1). In the first period of the game, t = 0, the firm makes
capital investments k ∈ R+. Capital investments are associated with marginal investment
costs of 1. They can either be funded by the firm itself or raised from outside investors.
To sharpen our argument, we abstract from any agency conflicts between the principal and
outside investors. Hence, the following analysis does not depend on the sources of funds and
we do not further pursue this issue. Furthermore, we assume that capital investments are
relationship specific and for simplicity set the outside value of invested capital to zero. Our
qualitative results do not hinge on this stark assumption and would still hold as long as the
outside value was sufficiently smaller than the inside value or if a liquidation decision was
irreversible.
The labor market consists of a mass N of homogenous prospective employees (“agents”).
In every period t = 1, 2, ..., the firm makes a short-term employment offer to nt ≥ 0 agents;
if nt = 0, the firm consumes its outside option π ≥ 0. Agents receiving an offer are indexed
i ∈ [0, nt]. N – the size of the labor market – is sufficiently large for the firm to not be
exogenously bounded when choosing nt. Each offer consists of a fixed wage wit ≥ 0 and the
promise to make a contingent bonus payment bit ≥ 0.3 This bonus promise provides the
agents with incentives and is paid at the principal’s discretion.
An agent’s decision whether to accept an offer or not is captured by dit ∈ {0, 1}, where
dit = 1 describes an acceptance and dit = 0 a rejection. The number of agents who accept an
offer is nt, i.e., nt =
nt́
0
ditdi. After accepting an offer, all nt employed agents then make their
effort choice. Effort is binary, eit ∈ {0, 1}, and associated with private costs c(eit), where
c(0) = 0 and c(1) = c > 0. All agents who rejected an offer as well as those who did not
receive one consume their outside options u ≥ 0 in the respective period.






. Note that if all of the nt employed
agents choose et = 1, then yt = f (nt, k). f (·, k) is a continuous function in both arguments,
with f1, f2 > 0 and f11, f22 < 0. We do not place restrictions on the sign of f12 but assume
that the second order condition in the maximization problem below is always satisfied.
After producing, the firm sells the output and generates revenues θtyt. θt ∈ {θl, θh} is
a parameter specifying the demand conditions – think “price” – for the firm’s output - with
3Note that the restriction of payments to non-negative values is without loss of generality in our setting.
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0 < θl < θh - and is realized after the output has been produced. High demand is realized
with probability p, low demand with 1 − p. These probabilities are independent over time,
i.e., there is no persistency in demand conditions. After the sale of output, payments wit
and bit are made. Hence, the bonus can be contingent on the realization of θ (in addition to
chosen effort), i.e., bit(eit, θt), whereas wit is fixed by assumption.
We assume the firm to be liquidity constrained: all funds used to compensate employees
must be earned via the sale of its products. This implicitly assumes that the firm does not
retain profits earned in earlier periods and has no access to credit markets. We relax the
first assumption in Section 6 and show that it does not have any impact on our qualitative
results if retaining profits is costly. The second assumption is without loss of generality if
firms can not use their physical assets to collateralize a loan (e.g. because they have zero
value to outsiders). In this case borrowing would only shift the commitment problem from
the firm’s relationship with its employees to the relationship with its creditors.












Information, Payoffs, Strategies and Equilibrium
As discussed above, an employed agent’s effort, eit, is not verifiable and hence cannot be
used in formal, court-enforceable, contracts. Moreover, we abstract from explicit incentive
contracts and assume output yt and revenues θtyt to be not verifiable as well.4
Effort levels, nt, acceptance decisions dit, and wage and bonus payments can be observed
by the principal as well as by all other agents. Thus, multilateral relational contracts can
be used to motivate employees; see Levin (2002). Informally speaking, this implies that
all agents as well as the labor market can detect any deviation from equilibrium behavior.
In particular, any deviation by the principal can be punished by all agents, increasing the
principal’s commitment power.
4Note that this assumption is without loss of generality since output cannot be used to detect an individual
agent’s effort level in this multi-agent production setting.
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Finally, every realization of the demand parameter θ is observable to all parties – it might
reflect the general state of the economy or the specific industry where the firm is active.5
Hence there are no informational asymmetries, and agency problems only arise due to the
non-verifiability of effort.













(wiτ + biτ (eit, θτ )) di− π

where the indicator function describes whether the principal made offers (and hence op-
erates the firm) in period t, and expectation is over the realizations of θ. Furthermore,
Π0 = −k + δΠ1.





δτ−t [u+ diτ (wiτ + biτ (eit, θτ )− c(eit)− u)]
}
.
We only consider pure strategies, and define a multilateral relational contract as a Subgame
Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) where after every history strategies determine a Nash Equilibrium.
More precisely, we are interested in a SPE that maximizes the firm’s expected profits at the
beginning of the game, i.e., Π0; we think this is a natural choice given that the labor market
is assumed to be competitive, which allows firms to make take-it-or-leave-it offers to agents.
Furthermore, we can omit the index i. Since agents are identical and multilateral re-
lational contracts can – and should – be used, all employees will be treated the same in
equilibrium. In addition, we focus on equilibria where employment offers are accepted by
employees (dit = 1 for all i ∈ [0, nt]), and where all employed agents choose e = 1 (i.e.,
nt́
0
eitdi = nt). This clearly is optimal, since making an offer which is rejected and employing
an agent who does not exert effort is dominated by not making an offer to any of such agents.
In Appendix A, in Lemma A1, we show that we can focus on stationary contracts that
are independent of calendar time, as well as past realizations of demand shocks. Hence,
employment as well as wt and bt are constant over time, allowing us to omit time subscripts
t. This is driven by shocks being distributed i.i.d., by employment being chosen before the
5See Englmaier and Segal (2011) or Li and Matouschek (2013) for an analysis of situations where shocks
to the firm are not observable to the workforce.
7
state of the world is realized, and by the principal - the party facing the liquidity constraint
- being able to reap the whole surplus. Hence, only equilibrium bonus payments might vary
over time – depending on the respective realization of θ. There, bh is the equilibrium bonus
given θh is observed, and bl the bonus for θl. Finally, we set the outside options π = u = 0.
This assumption does not affect our results qualitatively, but simplifies our analysis given
the firm’s liquidity constraint.
3 Maximization Problem and Constraints
Our objective is to find levels of capital k, (stationary) employment n, as well as a compen-
sation package (w, bl, bh) to maximize
Π0 = −k + δΠ,
where
Π =
p(θhf(n, k)− nbh) + (1− p)(θlf(n, k)− nbl)− nw
1− δ
is the firm’s expected discounted equilibrium payoff stream in any period t ≥ 1.
In addition, the following constraints have to be satisfied to enforce a stationary SPE.
First, it must be optimal for an agent who receives an offer to accept it. This is captured by
an individual rationality (IR) constraint,
U ≥ 0, (IR)
where U = w+pbh+(1−p)bl−c+δU is an employed agent’s expected discounted equilibrium
payoff stream and where we assume that an agent who rejects an offer does not receive
another one in any subsequent period; this latter assumption will turn out to be without loss
of generality.
Since employed agents are supposed to exert high effort, an incentive compatibility (IC)
constraint must hold for each agent. Given promised bonus payments bl (after θ = θl) and
bh (after θ = θh) are made, we have
pbh + (1− p)bl − c+ δU ≥ 0. (IC)
We assume that an agent is fired (and never re-hired) after selecting e = 06. Note that
6This is based on the assumption that once an agent deviated, the principal assumes he will not exert
effort in the future as well. The analysis would be identical, though, if the principal believed that an agent’s
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given w ≥ 0, (IR) is automatically implied by the (IC) constraint, and we can omit the
former in the following.
It must be in the interest of the principal to actually pay out bl and bh to each agent,
which is characterized by dynamic enforcement (DE) constraints. There, if she fails to make a
promised payment (which never happens in equilibrium), we assume a reversion to the static
Nash equilibrium.7 This is characterized by no bonuses paid to any agent, who in return all
choose e = 0 given they are hired. The principal then is indifferent between shutting down
or running the firm without profits, in any case her off-equilibrium payoff stream is zero.
Informally speaking, the firm’s failure to keep promises made to one agent leads to a loss
of trust of the whole (current and prospective new) workforce.8 Therefore, the firm either
rewards all agents or none.
The two dynamic enforcement (DE) constraints, one for bl and one for bh, are
−nbl + δΠ ≥ 0 (DEl)
and
−nbh + δΠ ≥ 0. (DEh)
In addition, running the firm (and making employment offers) has to be optimal for the
firm in every period, i.e. Π ≥ 0. Because of stationarity and given that bonus payments are
non-negative, this condition is automatically implied by the firm’s (DE) constraints. Since
the right hand sides of (DEl) and (DEh) are identical, only one of them has to be considered,
depending on whether bl or bh is larger.
Finally, payments must not violate the firm’s liquidity (L) constraints, which state that











≤ θhf(n, k). (Lh)
deviation was a singular event, which is driven by agents not receiving a rent in any profit-maximizing
equilibrium (derived below).
7Following Abreu (1988): The static Nash Equilibrium determines the lower bound on the principal’s
profits and should hence constitute her punishment following observable deviations.
8Note that even if prospective agents were not able to observe the principal’s previous actions, merely
receiving an offer could serve as a signal of an earlier deviation of the principal.
9
4 Equilibrium Employment n∗
In this section, we derive (profit-maximizing) equilibrium employment – denoted n∗ – and
how it is affected by the firm’s liquidity constraints. We show that the latter induce risk-
aversion-like behavior: For a given level of expected profits, the firm would always (weakly)
prefer a lower volatility.
As a first step, we can show that (IC) constraints bind in any profit-maximizing equilib-
rium, and that it is further optimal to set w = 0 (see Lemma A1 in Appendix A). These
results follow from the observability of effort and the excess supply of agents in the labor
market, allowing the firm to reap the entire surplus from its employment relationship in any
profit-maximizin equilibrium. Hence, the firm will try to maximize the total surplus subject
to the constraints derived above.
Benchmark – First-Best-Employment As a benchmark we derive the value of n
that maximizes the total surplus. In the following, we denote this efficient – or first-best –
employment level nFB. For a given capacity level k , nFB is characterized by
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
f1(·, ·)− c = 0. (FB)
To keep the analysis interesting, we impose Assumption 1, implying that running the firm
is strictly better than not running it. Given the concavity of the production function, this is
also the case if first-best effort is not enforceable.
Assumption 1: f(nFB, k)
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
− nFBc > 0 for all levels of k ≥ 0.
Furthermore, we potentially want to allow the firm’s liquidity constraints to have some
bite, hence we impose
Assumption 2: nFBc > θlf(nFB, k)
If Assumption 2 was violated, the firm would never be restricted by constrained liquidity
and could always set bh = bl = c.
Benchmark – Verifiable Effort As another benchmark, we consider the situation
where effort is verifiable but the liquidity constraints are in force. In this case, employment
will in any case be at its efficient level. Hence, the firm’s constrained liquidity alone does not
yield any restrictions with respect to enforceable employment, only in interaction with the
non-verifiability of effort.
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Lemma 1 Assume that effort is verifiable. Then, equilibrium employment equals nFB.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The intuition is straightforward: Given that the firm has no commitment problems, it
can choose to pay the agent in whatever state of the world it wants to. This allows the firm
to pay mostly in those states of the world where it is not liquidity constraint (i.e. after high
profits) and liquidity constraints in individual states of the world are never a problem.
Result I – Restricted Employment If effort is not verifiable, employment can be
inefficiently low, namely when one of the remaining constraint binds. More precisely, we have
Proposition 1 For a given capital level k, the firm chooses equilibrium employment n∗ to
maximize Π = (
pθh+(1−p)θl)f(n,k)−nc
(1−δ) , subject to
n∗c ≤ δp
2
1− δ + δp
θhf(n∗, k) + (1− p)θlf(n∗, k), (DE-L)
and
n∗c ≤ δf(n∗, k)
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
. (DE)
There are discount factors δ = θ
l
(pθh+(1−p)θl)
and δ, with δ < δ < 1, such that
• n∗ = nFB for δ ≥ δ
• n∗ < nFB for δ ≤ δ < δ, and n∗ is determined by the binding (DE-L) constraint
• n∗ < nFB for δ < δ, and n∗ is determined by the binding (DE) constraint.
Proof: See Appendix B.
If the principal is very patient, i.e. δ ≥ δ, there is no commitment problem and the
first-best can be enforced. Because of Assumption 2, bonus payments vary across states,
and bh > bl. However, the discounted future value of the relationship is so large that the
firm credibility is sufficient to promise large payments. Note that δ not only depends on the
surplus of the relationship (as δ does), but also on the volatility of earnings. This aspect will
be made more precise below, when describing result 2.
If δ is between δ and δ, the firm’s faces some commitment problem, which however is not
solely created by its discounted future surplus being too low (if the firm was not liquidity
constrained, the first-best could still be enforced in this range). Since constrained liquidity
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restricts the firm’s ability to compensate agents in low-demand states, it will still be optimal to
have bh > bl, i.e. total bonus payments are higher in the good than in the bad state. However,
the principal’s willingness to reward agents is determined by the expected discounted future
surplus, not by current profits. Therefore, the firm’s reneging temptation is higher in the
good than in the bad state, which restricts employment given that the expected discounted
future surplus is not high enough, i.e. if δ < δ. Hence, the lower δ, the lower are enforceable
payments in the good state. However, at δ = δ we reach the point where bh reaches bl and
a further reduction of δ reduces enforceable payments in both states. Then, constrained
liquidity is not an issue and employment is only restricted by the future surplus being too
small. In this case bh = bl, and the total compensation received by the workforce does not
vary over time.
To sum up the results so far, δ = θl
(pθh+(1−p)θl)
determines whether (DE-L) or (DE) is the
relevant constraint. Fixing θl, δ decreases in p and θh. Thus, higher values of p or θh make it
more likely that the firm is affected by (DE-L), i.e. its employment might also be restricted
by a cash shortage and not only by its future returns being too low.
Result II – Volatility Matters In a next step, we demonstrate that it is not only
players’ impatience (i.e. a low δ) that limits commitment if the firm faces a liquidity con-
straint. This is different from “standard” contributions like MacLeod and Malcomson (1989)
or Levin (2003), where the enforceability of relational is solely determined by the discount
factor. We can show that the liquidity constraint will bind – and hence the firm’s employ-
ment level is restricted to inefficiently low levels – even if the principal is arbitrarily patient.
This is the case if the firms’ cash-flow is very uncertain in the sense that there is a small
probability that the firm makes very high profits.
Proposition 2 Assume δ ≥ δ, i.e., the (DE) constraint (DE) can be omitted. Then, for fixed
employment n̂ > θ
lf(n,k)
c
, θl and c, as well as for a fixed per-period surplus f(n)
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
−
nc, there exists a p such that for p < p, constraint (DE-L) does not hold for n̂.
Proof: See Appendix B.
A reduction of p, accompanied by an increase of θh in order to keep the surplus for a
given employment level fixed will eventually lead to a violation of (DE-L).9 This result is
driven by the combination of liquidity and dynamic enforcement constraints. Absent (Ll), the
enforceability of an employment level n would – for a given discount factor δ – only depend
9Note that given employment, θl, c and surplus stay constant, also δ is unaffected.
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on the future surplus, independent of the exact specification of p and θ. If a large surplus is
accompanied by a larger variability of income, the principal’s commitment is still restricted.
The reason is that when constrained liquidity has bite, larger shares of the compensation
package must be shifted to high-demand states, ceteris paribus increasing the temptation to
renege. Hence, the (DE-L) constraint is more likely to bind if the expected surplus generated
in the relationship is high, and if the firm operates in a high-risk/high return environment.
In addition, we can show that given δ ≥ δ and given the surplus is held constant, enforce-
able employment increases in p. Define ñ as the employment level where constraint (DE-L)
binds, i.e., ñ is characterized by
ñc =
p2δ
1− δ + pδ
θhf(ñ) + (1− p)θlf(ñ). (1)
Due to the concavity of f(n) in n, ñ exists, (DE-L) is satisfied for n ≤ ñ, and violated for
n > ñ. Hence, for ñ < nFB only an inefficiently low employment level can be enforced. Then,
we can establish
Lemma 2 Fix θland the total per-period surplus (given positive effort),
f(n)
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
− nc.
Then, ñ is strictly increasing in p.
Proof of Lemma 2: This follows from the fact that the right hand side of (1) is increasing
in p, given the surplus is held constant (see the proof to Proposition 1). 
To sum up, this section establishes the potential enforcement problem induced by the
liquidity constraint, assuming a fixed capacity level. Even if the firm is very patient, its
commitment in relational contracts with its employees is limited if its earnings are volatile:
Bonus payments must vary across states, whereas the maximum amount of bonuses that the
principal can commit to pay in any state of the world is determined by the expected future
surplus. This implies that the highest equilibrium bonus level determines whether high effort
is enforceable or not. If the likelihood of the good state is too low, the necessary bonus to
imply effort becomes so high that it is not optimal for the principal to honor his promises
anymore, consequently leading to inefficiently low employment.
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5 Optimal Capacity and the Scope for Overinvestments
We now derive the firm’s optimal capital choice. Because capital relaxes both enforceability
constraints, overinvestments will occur whenever either constraint (DE) or (DE-L) binds.
At the beginning of the game, the firm determines its optimal capital investments k∗ to
maximize Π0 = −k + δΠ, taking into account that the constraints
n∗c ≤ δf(n∗, k∗)
(






1− δ + δp
θhf(n∗, k∗) + (1− p)θlf(n∗, k∗) (DE-L)
have to be satisfied in all later periods.
As a benchmark, the optimal capicity level absent the constraints is implicitly defined by
∂Π0
∂k
= −1 + δ
1− δ
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
f2 = 0. (2)
If one of the constraints binds, though, the firm chooses capital investments that are
higher than specified by (2).
Proposition 3 Optimal capital investments are characterized by (2) if and only if efficient
employment nFB is enforceable, i.e., if δ ≥ δ (as defined in Proposition 1). If δ < δ, i.e.,
if either (DE) or (DE-L) binds, overinvestments into capital are optimal in the sense that
marginal costs exceed its direct marginal returns, i.e. k∗ exceeds the level specified by (2).
Proof: See Appendix B.
The intuition underlying Proposition 3 is straightforward. If δ < δ, i.e., the (DE) con-
straint binds, ex-ante overinvestments increase revenues in all future periods. Since invest-
ment costs are sunk, the difference between profits in and out-of equilibrium increases, and
promises made to the firm’s workforce become more credible.10 If δ ≥ δ (but below δ) and the
(DE-L) constraint binds, overinvestments are optimal because a higher value of k increases
output and thereby the available cash-flow in each state of the world. Then a larger share
of total compensation can be shifted to the low state, thereby relaxing the firm’s (DEh)
constraint.
10A similar argument is used by Halac (2014) to show that the hold-up problem (generating underinvest-
ments into relationship-specific assets) can be less severe in a relationship where relational contracts have to
be used ex-post.
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While in the classic corporate finance literature, a reduction of free cash-flow is regarded
as a potential remedy to overcome overinvestment problems, we show that the very lack of
free cash-flow in some states makes overinvestments ex-ante optimal.
6 Allowing the Firm to Save
In this section, we show that overinvestments can still be optimal if the firm is able to
save revenues, using them to relax the liquidity constraint in later periods. Assume that
firms are able to save cash revenues generated in high-demand periods and use them to
compensate agents in subsequent low-demand periods. This allows the firm to temporarily
increase its employment level. Holding cash reserves might or might not be optimal when the
firm’s liquidity constraint binds, but can never make it irrelevant. Hence, overinvestments
will continue to be part of the firm’s optimal investment decisions whenever employment is
restricted.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that accumulated cash stays within the firm and does
not generate interest payments. Our results remain valid as long as interest payments are
not so high that they render deferring consumption fully to future periods optimal.
If the firm decides to save, accumulated cash can be used in two ways. On the one hand,
employment can be increased until the next realization of θl. On the other hand, a given
employment level can be sustained longer, i.e. for more than just one subsequent realization
of θl. We delegate a general characterization of the firm’s optimal behavior to Appendix C
and only present the main result in this section.
Proposition 4 Savings are optimal if and only if in the situation absent savings, the (DE-L)
constraint binds (i.e., if δ is between δ and δ, as defined above in Proposition 1) and the
following condition is satisfied in equilibrium:(
δ (1− p)
[1− δp]
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
f1 − c > 0. (3)
If savings are optimal, maximum employment is characterized by(
δ (1− p)
[1− δp]
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
f1 − c = 0. (4)
Proof: See Appendix C.
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Holding cash reserves is never optimal if only dynamic enforcement constraints bind.
However, a binding liquidity constraint alone is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition
for savings to be optimal. Instead, the costs of saving – delayed consumption – might still
be too high compared to its benefits, which is the case if condition (3) does not hold.
In Appendix C, we further show that after a cash stock has been built up and the firm is hit
by a number of negative shocks, employment is decreased gradually. Then, each low-demand
period triggers an employment reduction until all savings have been used up. This parallels
results in Li and Matouschek (2013) where implemented effort levels gradually decrease with
every adverse shock hitting a firm.
Here, we do not solve for the actual amount of equilibrium savings in high-demand periods,
since it is not required for our purpose. Determining savings would be straightforward,
though. After solving for optimal employment for each history of demand-realizations (what
we do), the respective binding (DE-L) constraints give us the total savings needed in order
to maintain respective employment levels.
However, it is important to note that the possibility to accumulate cash reserves does not
eliminate overinvestments.
Proposition 5 Assume savings are possible. Then overinvestments are still observed when
either (DE) or (DE-L) constraints bind.
Proof of Proposition 5: When only (DE) constraints bind, savings are not optimal and
the situation is equivalent to above – overinvestments are an optimal response to relax the
constraint. If savings are optimal due to a binding (DE-L) constraint, employment never
exceeds the level characterized by (4) – hence is below the first best. The rest follows from
the proof to Proposition 3. 
7 Discussion and Conclusion
The present paper shows that observed overinvestments are not necessarily the (negative)
consequence of agency problems between shareholders and managers. Instead, they might
actually be a second-best-optimal response to contracting frictions: If firms cannot fully
rely on court-enforceable contracts to motivate their workforce but have to use relational
contracts, when they furthermore face volatile market conditions and hence varying cash-
flow streams, and when they are facing liquidity constraints, they have to rely on “excessive”
capital investments to increase their cash-flow base.
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Our argument is robust to granting firms access to an external capital market. The
“quality” of this external capital market, determined by the interest rate and to what extent
credits can be pledged against the firm’s assets, then affects the firm’s credibility in relational
contracts formed with its workforce.
The predictions of our model can be matched to empirically documented regularities.
Proposition 1 also implies that on average, firms with a higher discount factor have a larger
variation in residual profits and hence free cash flow: Given δ is between δ and δ, then
bln = θlf(n, k), and the firm has to use all of its revenues to compensate agents if demand is
low. On the other hand, if δ < δ, the liquidity constraint does not bind, and free cash flow
is also available in the low-demand state. If we assume that dividend payments (or more
generally the distribution of profits to owners/shareholders) are larger in states when more
cash-flow is available, we should expect firms with higher discount factor to have a larger
variability in dividend payments. This matches the finding in Michaely and Roberts (2012)
that privately held firms in the UK smooth dividends significantly less than their publicly
listed counterparts, and respond more to transitory earnings shocks. Michaely and Roberts
(2012) conjecture that this might be due to agency problems, which are more prominent in
publicly held firms. We offer an alternative but related explanation: Privately held firms
are often assumed to focus more on long-term goals – in particular with respect to their
employment relationships – compared to publicly listed firms. Take family firms, where for
example a study by Price Waterhouse Coopers (2012) identifies a larger commitment to jobs,
which leads “family-run businesses ... to have more loyalty toward their staff – people are
not just a number” (p. 6). In terms of our model, privately-held firms hence have a larger
discount factor, making it more likely that their dynamic enforcement constraint (DE-L) is
the relevant constraint, implying more variation in dividend payments.
In a related vein, a lower discount factor makes overinvestments (which are optimal given
δ < δ) generally more likely in our model. Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2008)
show that publicly listed firms in the US pay substantially more for acquisitions than privately
owned firms and argue that this might be due to larger agency problems in publicly-traded
firms. Our model again can provide a complementary explanation: Given publicly held firms
have a lower discount factor, they are more likely to use overinvestments in order to increase
their commitment in relational contracts with their workforce.11 This implies that – ceteris
paribus – their willingness to pay for a given acquisition target and henceforth investment
should be higher.
Finally, Lemma 2 has a testable prediction: If θh is very high, but the prospects of it
11Note that this result would still hold absent a liquidity constraint.
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being realized are low, enforceable employment is smaller than with a lower θh but higher
probability p. We should thus observe that industries which ceteris paribus are more volatile
have lower employment levels than industries where earnings are more balanced. We are not
aware of a study that has looked into this, but the prediction appears readily testable.
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A Maximization Problem, Constraints, and Proof of Sta-
tionarity
Note that it is sufficient to regard equilibrium employment as well as compensation as a
function of the history of past shocks. The reason is our focus on pure strategies. Denote the
history at the beginning of period t as θt−1 = {θ1, θ2, ..., θt−1}, with θt ∈ {θl, θh}, and θ0 = ∅.








































where bh(θt−1) is the bonus paid for history θt−1 given a high shock is realized in period
t. Equivalent definitions hold for bl(θt−1), Π (θt−1, θt) and U (θt−1, θt).
Then, the firm’s objective function is to choose k as well as n(θt−1), w(θt−1), bh(θt−1) and
bl(θt−1) to maximizue
Π0 = −k + δΠ(θ0),
subject to the following constraints, which must be satisfied for every history θt−1:
U(θt−1) ≥ 0 (IRA)


































Lemma 3 (IC) constraints bind, and w(θt−1) = 0 for every history θt−1.
Proof of Lemma 3: To the contrary, assume there is a history θ̃t−1 where (IC) does not
bind. At this point, reduce bh(θ̃t−1) as well as bl(θ̃t−1) by a small ε > 0 such that (IC) for
history θ̃t−1 is still satisfied. Furthermore, increase w(θ̃t−1) by ε and leave everything else
unchanged. This has no impact on Π0, as well as Π(θt−1) and U(θt−1) for any history θt−1
, hence does not affect any (IRA) constraint. Furthermore, all (Ll) and (Lh) constraints
remain unchanged. Finally (DEh) and (DEl) for history θ̃t−1 are relaxed and unaffected for
any other history.
Plugging this result into U(θt−1) gives U(θt−1) = w(θt−1); hence, setting w(θt−1) = 0 for
all histories θt−1 is optimal, since it relaxes the firm’s constraints and increases Π0. 



















































This allows us to prove
Lemma 4 Contracts are stationary in a sense that employment as well as bonus payments
are independent of the history of shocks θt−1.
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Proof of Lemma 4: First of all, note that none of the employment levels can optimally be
above nFB and that profits are increasing in n(θt−1) for any possible history as long as em-
ployment there is inefficiently low. Now, take any equilibrium employment level n(θt−2) and
assume that n(θt−2, θh) 6= n(θt−2, θl). If n(θt−2, θh) > n(θt−2, θl), replacing n(θt−2, θl) with
n(θt−2, θh) would violate no constraint and increase profits. If n(θt−2, θl) > n(θt−2, θh), on
the other hand, replacing n(θt−2, θh) with n(θt−2, θl) would violate no constraint and increase
profits. Hence employment in any period is independent of previous shock realizations and
might only be history-dependent based on the number of observed shocks, i.e. on timing.
There, however, note that the structure of the game is stationary. This implies that the
highest employment level that is enforceable in any period of the game can be enforced in all
other periods as well. Since the principal is able to collect the whole surplus of the game, it is
optimal to choose the maximum feasible employment (subject to n ≤ nFB) in every period.

B Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: If effort is verifiable, the firm’s dynamic enforcement constraints can
be omitted. We just have to make sure that the firm’s expected profits are positive.
Assume the following contract: Employment equals nFB, each agent who chooses positive
effort receives expected bonus payments pbh + (1 − p)bl = c and gets fired otherwise. If
nFBc ≤ θlf(nFB, k), then bl = bh = c, satisfying all constraints and obviously being optimal
for the principal due to Assumption 1.
Otherwise, i.e., if nFBc > θlf(nFB, k), the firm sets bl = θlf(nFB, k)/nFB, and bh =(
c− (1− p)θlf(nFB, k)/nFB
)
/p. Plugging this value into (Lh) gives
0 ≤ pθhf(nFB, k)+(1−p)θlf(nFB, k)−nFBc, which is always satisfied due to Assumption
1. 
Proof of Proposition 1. Recall that the firm’s objective is to maximize Π0 = −k + δΠ,
subject to the relevant constraints. For a given value of k, however, n is chosen to maximize
Π. Furthermore, we show in Appendix A that (IC) and (IRA) constraints bind. Hence, we


















≤ θhf(n, k) (Lh)
It follows that (DEl) and (Ll), as well as (DEh) and (Lh) generally do not bind at the
same time. In a next step, we show that (Lh) cannot bind in equilibrium. To the contrary
assume it binds. Then, either (Ll) or (DEl) must bind as well because otherwise, bl could be
increased and (Lh) relaxed without violating any constraint. First, assume that (Ll) binds
together with (Lh). This, however, would imply that Π = 0, which is not possible in an
equilibrium with positive employment. Now, assume that (DEl) binds together with (Lh).
From section 3, we know that setting bh ≥ bl is optimal. Hence, (DEh) has to bind as well,
implying bh = bl. Then, θhf(n, k) = nbh = nbl = θlf(n, k), which - due to θh > θl - is not
possible for n > 0.
Now, consider all employment levels with θlf(n, k) ≥ δΠ. In this case, (Ll) is auto-
matically satisfied given (DEl). Adding (DEh) and (DEl) proves the necessity of (DE-L).
Sufficiency immediately follows: Assuming (DE-L) holds, there always exists a bl ≥ 0 such
that (DEh) and (DEl) are satisfied.
For employment levels θlf(n, k) < δΠ (DEl) is automatically satisfied given (Ll). In this
case, necessity and sufficiency of (DE) are obtained equivalently as for (DE-L).
To prove that n∗ ≤ nFB, we set up the Lagrange function,
L =













1− δ + δp
θhf(n, k) + (1− p)θlf(n, k)− nc
]
,





pθhf1 + (1− p)θlf1 − c
) (
1
1−δ + δλDE + λDELL
)
−λDEc(1− δ)− λDELLpθhf1 1−δ1−δ+δp = 0.
Hence, if either (DE-L) or (DE) binds
(
pθhf1 + (1− p)θlf1 − c
)
> 0, and n∗ is inefficiently
small.
To determine δ and δ, fix employment n. Furthermore, (DE-L) is the relevant constraint
when the right hand side of (DE) is smaller than (DE-L) for a given employment level, or if
δ
(




Condition (5) holding as an equility gives the value δ = θl/
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
. To show
that nFB cannot be enforced at δ, plug δ into each of the constraints. This gives nc ≤ θlf(n, k)
which – by Assumption 2 – does not hold for nFB.
To prove the rest of the proposition, and in particular the existence of δ, we need
monotonicity of the constraints in δ, and that first-best employment can be enforced for
δ → 1. The latter follows from Assumption 1 ((DE-L) and (DE) both converge to n∗c ≤
pθhf(n∗, k) + (1 − p)θlf(n∗, k) for δ → 1). To prove monotoncity in δ, we obtain the
derivatives of the right hand sides of the (DE) and (DE-L) constraints with respect to δ,
f(n, k)
(





hf(n, k), respectively. Since both expression are pos-
itive, both constraints are relaxed by larger values of δ. 
Proof of Proposition 2. As we fix the surplus, as well as θl and n, a decrease in p has to
be compensated by an appropriate increase in θh. More precisely, taking the total derivative
of the per-period surplus, f(n, k)
(
dpθh + pdθh − dpθl
)






Take an arbitrary high-state probability p where constraint (DE-L) is satisfied. For any
probability p∗ < p, always counterbalanced by an increase of θh that keeps the surplus
constant, the right hand side of (DE-L) equals
δ





f(n, k) + (1− p∗)θlf(n, k)
=
δ
1− δ + p∗δ
(p∗)2





 f(n, k) + (1− p∗)θlf(n, k)
=
δ
1− δ + p∗δ
(p∗)2
(
θh − (θh − θl)lnp+ (θh − θl)lnp∗ + C
)
f(n, k) + (1− p∗)θlf(n, k)
For p∗ → 0, the last expression becomes
δ
1−δ(1−p∗)(θ
h − θl) lnp∗1
(p∗)2
f(n, k) + θlf(n, k)
= δ
1−δ (θ
h − θl) (p
∗)2
−2 f(n, k) + θ
lf(n, k) = θlf(n, k).
Since θlf(n, k) < nc, the employment level n will eventually not be enforceable anymore.





















. Since θlf(n, k) < cn, this ex-
pression is positive as long as n is enforceable if the liquidity constraint is absent. However,
if n is not enforceable without the principal’s liquidity constraint, (DE-L) is violated anyway.

Proof of Proposition 4. The Lagrange function in this case equals
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L =− k + δ
1− δ
[(















1− δ + δp
θhf(n∗, k) + (1− p)θlf(n∗, k)− n∗c
]
,
and the first order condition with respect to k is
∂L
∂k
=− 1 + δ
1− δ
(









1− δ + δp
θhf2 + (1− p)θlf2
]
= 0.
Hence, if either (DE) or (DE-L) binds, k∗ will satisfy−1 + δ
1−δ
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
f2 < 0,
implying a k∗ that is larger than the one characterized by (2). 
C Optimal Firm Behavior Given Savings are Possible
Assume that whenever demand conditions are high, the firm can save some of its revenues.
These cash reserves are used to increase employment from the next period on and compensate
some of the additional agents. After a number of subsequent low-demand periods, the cash
reserves are used up and employment is down at its original level again - until the next
high-demand period.
Definem ≥ 1 as the number of periods a higher employment level can at least be enforced,
i.e., m is the subsequent number of low-demand periods after which all cash reserves are used
up. Furthermore, define the amount saved as sm, and the employment level in the first period
after sm has been accumulated as nm.
Now, assume that sm has been saved and employment raised to nm in the next period. If
the firm faces a low-demand shock in this period, all nm agents are compensated accordingly.
However, some of the savings are needed, and available funds go down, to sm−1. Further-
more, employment in the next period will be nm−1. This process is continued until either all
cash reserves are used (and employment is at n0) or a high-demand shock allows to fill up
cash reserves and increase employment to nm again (which will always be optimal due to the
stationarity of the problem). To avoid unnecessary complications, we assume that income in
a high-demand state is sufficiently high to save the optimal amount sm, i.e., we impose
Assumption A1: Assume savings are possible. Then, (Lh) does not bind in a profit-
maximizing equilibrium.
Assumption A1 implies that only one high-demand state is needed in order to fill up the
24
firm’s desired cash stock.
Profits
We write payoffs as functions of the remaining subsequent low-demand shocks before all cash
reserves are used up. Profits given savings are at its maximum level are denoted Π̃(m), since








θlf(nm, k)− nm(1− p)blm + (sm − sm−1) + δΠ(m− 1)
]
.
Note that bonus payments are the amounts actually paid out to agents. Hence, if in a
low-demand state part of the payments are handed over to agents, this enters the principal’s
profits positively.
Furthermore, profits after j < m subsequent low-demand periods are
Π(m− j) =p
[




θlf(nm−j, k)− nm−j(1− p)blm−j + (sm−j − sm−j−1) + δΠ(m− j − 1)
]
.
After m − 1 subsequent low-demand period, a higher employment can only be enforced
for maximum one more low-demand period. Then,
Π(1) = p
[














f(n, k)θl − n0bl + δΠ(0)
)
are profits given the firm has used all its cash.
Objective
The objective is to find the levels of m ≥ 0, nm−j (j ≤ m) and the respective amounts of
cash that maximize Π(0), given the constraints derived below. Hence, we maximize profits
given no cash is initially available. It will turn out, though, that the respective strategy
also maximizes −sm + δΠ(m), the firm’s objective given savings could also be raised at the
beginning of the game (when capital k is raised).
Constraints
The following constraints have to be satisfied in any equilibrium. For all j ∈ [0,m], dynamic




m−j ≤ δΠ(m− j)− sm−j (DEl(j))
nm−jb
h
m−j ≤ δΠ(m)− sm. (DEh(j))
Savings enter the above constraints since if the principal reneges on payments promised
to agents, it will also be optimal to consume accumulated savings. Furthermore, note that
s0 = 0
Since (Lh) is satisfied by assumption, liquidity constraints must only hold for low-demand
states.
For all j ∈ [0,m− 1], we have
nm−jb
l
m−j ≤ θlf(nm−j, k) + (sm−j − sm−j−1) , (Ll(j))
where also s−1 = 0 in LLl(0).
In addition (IC) constraints must hold (where we already take into account that agents
receive no rent), namely
pbhm−j + (1− p)blm−j − c ≥ 0
for all j ∈ [0,m].




In this section, we first assume that it is optimal to accumulate strictly positive cash reserves
(which implies m ≥ 1) and derive properties of a profit-maximizing equilibrium. Then, we
work out conditions under which it is actually optimal to save.
First, we show that given savings are optimal, (DEl) constraints can be omitted.
Lemma 5 Assume m ≥ 1. Then, all (DEl) are automatically implied by the respective (Ll)
constraints.
Proof of Lemma 5: First, we plug blm−j =
c−pbhm−j




≤ δΠ(m− j)− sm−j (DEl(j))
nm−jb
h





≤ θlf(nm−j, k) + (sm−j − sm−j−1) (Ll(j))
Hence, for each j, DEl(j) and LLl(j) constraints can generally not bind simultaneously,
but only one of them - together with the respective DEh(j) constraint.
Adding (DElj) and (DEhj) for each j gives a set of necessary constraints:





Note that any DE(j) constraint can only bind if the respective DEl(j) constraint binds
as well. Now, assume there is a profit maximizing equilibrium with a j∗ ≥ 1 where DE(j∗)
binds but LLl(j∗) is slack.
To see that this cannot be optimal, reduce all sm−j with j ≤ j∗ by ε and leave everything
else unchanged. This tightens LLl(j∗) which however will still hold for ε sufficiently small.
LLl(j) constraints for all j besides j∗ remain unaffected.
Furthermore, profits change by ∆Π(0) = pε1−(δ(1−p))
j∗+1
1−δ(1−p) , hence go up. Furthermore, we
can show that no constraint gets violated. To see that, note that
∆Π(m) = −ε (δ(1− p))j
∗
(1− p) ,
∆Π(m− j∗) = − ε (1− p)
1− δ(1− p)
(
1− δ + δp (δ(1− p))j
∗
)
and - for any 1 < k < m,
∆Π(m− (j∗ − k)) = δp∆Π(m)− ε (δ(1− p))
k [1− p] (1− δ)
1− δ(1− p)
and








These considerations help us to show that by reducing all sm−j with j ≤ j∗ by ε relaxes
all constraints:


























1−δ(1−p) > 0. Finally, DE(j
∗ − k) is relaxed because its







δ∆Π̃(m− (j∗ + k))
)
> 0.
Hence, DE(j) – and consequently DEl(j) constraints can be omitted for all j ≥ 1. Finally,
we have to show that this also holds for j = 0.
Adding DEh(j) and LLl(j) for all j ∈ [1,m] gives constraints that are necessary and
sufficient for the respective employment and savings levels to be enforceable:
δpΠ̃(m)− psm + (1− p)θlf(nm−j, k)− nm−jc+ (1− p) (sm−j − sm−j−1) ≥ 0 (DE-L(j))
For j = 0, we have the necessary constraints
δpΠ(m)− psm + (1− p)θlf(n, k)− nc ≥ 0 (DE-L(0))
and
δpΠ(m)− psm + δ(1− p)Π(0)− nc ≥ 0. (DE(0))
To see that DE(0) constraints can also be omitted as long as savings are positive, note
that using the previously established result that DE-L(j) are stricter than DE(j) constraints
for j ≥ 1 and in particular for j = m− 1 gives us
δ(1− p)
(









h + (1− p)f(n0, k)θl − nc
]
−(1− p) (1− δ(1− p)) s1(1− δ)
≥ (1− p)θlf(n1, k) + (1− p)s1.
Since n1 ≥ n0 (and given that employment cannot be inefficiently high), we also know
that
(











pθhf(n1, k) + (1− p)θlf(n1, k)
)
≥ (1− p)θlf(n1, k) + (1− p)s1 + (1− p) (1− δ(1− p)) s1(1− δ)and - since s1 > 0 -
δ
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
≥ θl, (6)
if savings are optimal.
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Now, rewrite DE(0) constraints as
p (δΠ(m)− sm) + δ(1 − p)
(
pf(n0, k)θ
h + (1− p)f(n0, k)θl
)
− n0c ≥ 0. This condition is
implied by DE-L(0) if
p (δΠ(m)− sm) + δ(1− p)
(
pf(n0, k)θ
h + (1− p)f(n0, k)θl
)
− n0c
≥ δpΠ(m)− psm + (1− p)θlf(n0, k)− n0c, or if
δ
(
pθh + (1− p)θl
)
≥ θl,
which is equivalent to (6). 
Hence, all DEl constraints can be omitted given savings are optimal. In a next step, we
simplify the problem by adding DEh(j) and LLl(j) constraints for each j, which gives a set
of necessary and sufficient constraints (sufficiency follows from the same reasoning as in the
situation without savings). For each j ∈ [0,m], we have
δpΠ̃(m)− psm + (1− p)θlf(nm−j, k)− nm−jc+ (1− p) (sm−j − sm−j−1) ≥ 0, (DE-L(j))
where s0 = s−1 = 0.
In a next step, we show that given savings are optimal, all DE-L constraints must bind:
Lemma 6 If sm > 0, DE-L(j) constraints bind for each j ∈ [0,m].
Proof of Lemma 6: If there was one j where DE-L(j) did not bind, the respective em-
ployment level could be raised without violating any constraint, thereby increasing profits.

This result allows us to use δpΠ(m) = n0c−(1−p)θlf(n0, k)+psm as well as (sm−j − sm−j−1) =
nm−jc−δpΠ(m)−(1−p)θlf(nm−j ,k)+psm






Π(m− j) = pθhf(nm−j, k) + psm−j + δ(1− p)Π(m− j − 1),






pθhf(nm−i, k) + psm−i
)





In a next step, we can show that employment is gradually going down once cash reserves
are used in low-demand periods:
Lemma 7 nm−j+1 > nm−j for all j ∈ [1,m]
Proof of Lemma 7: First, we show that nm−j+1 ≥ nm−j. To the contrary, assume there
is a j̃ with nm−j̃+1 < nm−j̃. Consider the following change: Replace both employment lev-







. Note that this leaves DE-L(j̃) as well as other constraints unaf-
fected. However, this change increases Π(m) and thereby Π(0):
∆Π(m)
(δ(1− p))j̃−1






























pθhf(nm−j+1, k) + (1− p)θlf(nm−j+1, k)− nm−j+1c
)
> 0,
where the last inequality follows from nm−j > nm−j+1, and from both employment levels
being inefficiently low.
To complete the proof, it remains to show that nm−j+1 = nm−j is not possible. To the
contrary, assume there is a ĵ with nm−ĵ+1 = nm−ĵ. Now, marginally increase nm−ĵ+1 and




1−p to keep DE-L(ĵ+1)






























Therefore, nm−j+1 > nm−j because otherwise profits were not at its maximum. 
Finally, we can show that maximum employment nm is independent of m.






+ (1− p)θl∂f(nm, k)
∂nm
− c = 0.
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Proof of Lemma 8: Note that if savings are optimal, all DE-L(j) constraints bind for a
givenm, which implies that δpΠ(m)−psm+(1−p)θlf(nm−j, k)−nm−jc+(1−p) (sm−j − sm−j−1) =
0 can be used to obtain the necessary savings for all levels of nm−j. Then, the objective is
to maximize Π(0) = p
1−δ(1−p)f(n0, k)θ
h. Thus, employment levels nm−j are chosen in order
to maximize n0. Savings can only be optimal if DE-L(0) binds, in which case n0 is deter-
mined by δpΠ(m) − psm + (1 − p)θlf(n0, k) − n0c = 0. Hence, employment levels nm−j are
optimally chosen to maximize δΠ(m)− sm and determined by setting ∂(δΠ(m)−sm)∂nm−j = 0. This





= 0 for j̃ > ĵ, i.e. in particular ∂sm−j
∂nm
= 0 for j > 0. This is implied




























+ (1− p)θl∂f(nm, k)
∂nm
− c = 0.

This result shows that a larger value of m does not increase maximum employment, but
rather “smoothes” the process of layoffs after negative demand shocks.
Finally, we can prove Proposition 3:
Proof of Proposition 3: Lemma (8) gives (4) for maximum employment. Furthermore,
note that if savings are optimal, then nm > nm−1 > ... > n. Hence, if maximum enforceable




h + (1− p)θl
)
f1 − c ≤ 0, savings cannot be
optimal. 
Here, we do not aim for solving for the optimalm, i.e. the maximum number of subsequent
negative shocks until savings are used up. The optimal level of m would again be determined
by maximizing δΠ(m) − sm. To get around integer problems, we would first treat m as a
continuous variable, set ∂(δΠ(m)−sm)
∂m
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